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HUD AND HOUSING IN THE 1990s: CRISES IN
AFFORDABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Michael Allan Wolf*
America is increasingly becoming a nation of housing haves and
have-nots. While the majority of American homeowners are well
housed and have significant equity in their homes, the prosperity of
these homeowners does not reflect the plight of the nation's grow-
ing number of low- and moderate-income households.'
[D]uring the tenure of Secretary Pierce HUD was an agency in
total disarray and was woefully mismanaged. Housing programs
established to benefit the poor were abused. During much of the
1980's, HUD was enveloped by influence peddling, favoritism,
abuse, greed, fraud, embezzlement and theft. In many housing
problems objective criteria gave way to political preference and
cronyism, and favoritism supplanted fairness. "Discretionary" be-
came a buzzword for "giveaway."2
I. Introduction: A Plethora of Programs?
Half a century ago, in the Housing Act of 1949, Congress declared
optimistically that every American should have access to safe, decent,
affordable housing.3 In an effort to realize that ambitious objective,
federal lawmakers have devised and bureaucrats have implemented a
wide array of housing schemes. One commentator has provided nine
categories for what he deems the "bewildering variety of housing-re-
lated programs:"
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond. This is an updated and expanded
version of an article co-authored by Mr. Wolf. See Sharp & Wolf, The Housing Crises:
Shortfalls in Affordability and Accountability, 44 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 225 (1990).
The author thanks Jeffrey F. Sharp for his important contributions to Part II of the
original version of this article, Karla Palmer for her diligent research assistance, and John
Paul Jones and Betty Morganstern Wolf for helping to sharpen some of the arguments as
they appeared in earlier drafts.
1. JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE STATE
OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 1 (1988) [hereinafter NATION'S HOUSING].
2. COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, ABUSE AND MISMANAGEMENT
AT HUD: TWENTY-FOURTH REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERA-
TIONS TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS, H.R. Doc. No. 101-977, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1990) [hereinafter REPORT].
3. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, § 502, 63 Stat. 413 (1949). One "goal"
included in the preamble is "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every
American family." Id at 413.
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1. a federally regulated mortgage finance system;
2. mortgage insurance;
3. interest rate subsidies to home owners, developers, and
landlords;
4. tax deductions for mortgage interest;
5. special depreciation allowances for rental housing;
6. low-rent public housing;
7. rent supplements for low-income households;
8. subsidy packages for central city redevelopment; and
9. anti-discrimination measures.4
To this list, we can add urban homesteading, Nehemiah Housing Op-
portunity Grants, housing vouchers, Housing Development Grants,
and other recent variations on the affordable housing theme.5
While observers of federal housing initiatives may disagree strongly
about the wisdom and efficacy of one or more of these varied ap-
proaches, the fact remains that the goal of decent housing for all has
not yet been reached. Nor, in the light of recent revelations, investi-
gations and admissions, can we accurately state that the federal offi-
cials responsible for overseeing and administering the means for
achieving that goal have performed at acceptable levels of competence
and responsibility.
This article highlights two acute crises that face the nation as we
seek to renew our national commitment to decent housing: 6 the
widening gap between housing costs and household income, and the
recent scandal over federal housing programs that has embroiled (and
threatens the future effectiveness of) the federal government's lead
agency in this crucial area - the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD, H.U.D. or Department).7 The author's purpose
4. Mitchell, The Historical Context for Housing Policy, FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY
AND PROGRAMS 3-4 (1985).
5. See, e.g., C. HAAR & M. WOLF, LAND-USE PLANNING 1014-19 (4th ed. 1989).
6. See Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625,
§ 102, 104 Stat. 4079, 4085 (1990) ("The objective of national housing policy shall be to
reaffirm the long-established national commitment to decent, safe, and sanitary housing
for every American . . ").
7. Although HUD can trace its inception as a cabinet-level department to September
1965, the Department inherited a number of existing programs from its most recent pre-
cursor - the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA). M. MCFARLAND, FED-
ERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN PROBLEM; HUD: SUCCESSES, FAILURES, AND THE
FATE OF OUR CITIES 19-21 (1978). Included in the HHFA legacy were the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA), National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 1, 48 Stat.
1246, 1246 (1934), Public Housing Administration (PHA), Reorganization Plan No. 3 of
1947, 61 Stat. 954 (1947), and the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), Pub.
L. No. 80-864, § 301, 62 Stat. 1206 (1948). Despite this head start, the public law creat-
ing HUD provided an early clue that the goals of the new agency were much too
ambitious:
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is straightforward: only after appreciating the breadth of these two
formidable challenges can we proceed to shape and effectively imple-
ment a federal housing agenda for the 1990s - the goal of liberals
and conservatives alike in the legislative and executive branches.' It
makes little sense to proceed with active implementation and full
funding of an ambitious National Affordable Housing Act 9 - partic-
mo achieve the best administration of the principal programs of the Federal
Government which provide assistance for housing and for the development of
the Nation's communities; to assist the President in achieving maximum coordi-
nation of the various Federal activities which have a major effect upon urban
community, suburban, or metropolitan development; to encourage the solution
of problems of housing, urban development, and mass transportation ... ; to
encourage the maximum contributions that may be made by vigorous private
homebuilding and mortgage lending industries to housing, urban development
and the national economy; and to provide for full and appropriate consideration
... of the needs and interests of the Nation's communities and of the people
who live and work in them.
Department of Housing and Urban Development Act, Pub. L. No. 89-174, § 2, 79 Stat.
667, 667 (1965).
8. The Findings and Conclusions section of the House of Representatives Commit-
tee on Government Operations report, Abuse and Mismanagement at HUD: Twenty-
Fourth Report by the Committee on Government Operations Together with Additional
Views, begins with this understatement: "Since it was created in 1965, HUD has not been
an agency without problems." REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. Surviving shifting political
trends seems to have been the Department's most significant obstacle. Richard Nixon's
dismantling of Democratic programs was replicated by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. See
Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 848, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (court refused to order HUD
Secretary "to resume accepting, processing, and, where appropriate, approving applica-
tions for federal subsidy under three different housing programs" suspended by President
Nixon's moratorium); NASULGC Urban Housing Working Group, A Statement of Ap-
propriate Private and Public Responses to Urban Housing Needs, 36 WASH. U.J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 63, 81-82 (1989) [hereinafter NASULGC] (charts illustrating decline in
budget funding for HUD housing programs); see also Simons, Toward a New National
Housing Policy, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y Rnv. 259 (1988). "The very existence of a federal
housing policy has been threatened in the 1980s. Federal appropriations for new housing
commitments were slashed by almost 80%, more than any other sector of the national
budget." Id. at 260.
These are not, by a long shot, the sole examples of the politicization of the Department.
See Lord, Government Agencies, in THE GREENWOOD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
INSTrrUTIONS, 122, 127 (D. Whitnah ed. 1983):
It is somewhat remarkable that since its inception HUD has been used for pur-
poses extraneous to its role as the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment. It was established in order to elevate a black to the Cabinet. It was
invigorated by programs to calm the black protest from the ghetto. It was dis-
mantled by an ideological opponent, as part of Nixon's overall scheme to dimin-
ish the federal government. It was half-heartedly revived by President Carter,
who wanted credit with his liberal constituency at little cost. And it was gutted
by the Reagan Administration intent on reducing government expenditures.
9. The official name of the new comprehensive housing legislation is the Cranston-
Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act (Cranston-Gonzalez Act). Pub. L. No. 101-
625, § l(a), 104 Stat. 4079 (1990). President Bush signed the Cranston-Gonzalez Act on
November 28, 1990, referring to the measure as "a bipartisan initiative to break down the
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ularly the new Home Investment Partnership,' 0 National Homeown-
ership Trust Fund," and Homeownership and Opportunity for
People Everywhere (HOPE) 2 initiatives - before we address and re-
dress the shortfalls and failures of the recent past.
II. The Chronic Housing Crisis: Rising Costs and Reduced
Supply
Housing built with government subsidies in the 1960s is becoming
eligible for sale or conversion to upscale condominiums and devel-
opments; public housing is deteriorating and underfunded; and tax
incentives for ' encouraging private investment in low-income hous-
ing have been changed. At the same time, the demand for such
housing is increasing, as a greater proportion of the nation's popu-
lation falls below the poverty line.13
There is certainly no lack of statistical evidence indicating that the
nation is in the throes of a crisis in the provision of adequate hous-
ing.1 4 For example, a recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
Study, Current Housing Problems and Possible Federal Responses, 5
walls separating low-income people from the goal of homeownership." President Bush
Signs 1990 Housing Bill, Calls Preservation Incentives Too High, [Current Developments]
Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 655 (Dec. 10, 1990). See also National Affordable Housing
Act: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs US. Senate, S. HRG. No. 948, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. (Sept. 14, 21, 22, 28, 1988).
10. See Home Investment Partnership Act (HOME), Pub. L. No. 101-625, §§ 201-89,
104 Stat. 4079, 4094-4128 (1990); Conferees Complete Major Housing Authorization Bill;
House Approves, [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 498, 498 (Oct. 29,
1990) (describing HOME as "a comprehensive program to allow states and local govern-
ments flexibility in tailoring housing assistance to their area's needs").
11. See National Homeownership Trust Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, §§ 301-10, 104
Stat. 4079, 4129-33 (1990); Conferees Complete Major Housing Authorization Bill; House
Approves, [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 498 (Oct. 29, 1990) (pur-
pose of National Homeownership Trust Act is "to provide down payment and mortgage
assistance to first-time home buyers").
12. See Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere Programs (HOPE),
Title IV, Pub. L. No. 101-625, §§ 401-48, 104 Stat. 4079, 4148-80 (1990); Conferees Com-
plete Major Housing Authorization Bill; House Approves, [Current Developments] Hous.
& Dev. Rep. (BNA) 498 (Oct. 29, 1990) (HOPE program offered by Bush Administra-
tion "to allow public and assisted housing tenants an opportunity to purchase their
units").
13. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
ISSUES, Doc. No. OCG-89-22TR HUD ISSUES, at 4 (1988) [hereinafter GAO STUDY].
14. See, e.g., NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE UNIV. AND LAND GRANT COLLEGES HOUSING
TASK FORCE, URBAN HOUSING: NEED AND REsPONSE (1988); NAT'L HOUSING TASK
FORCE, A DECENT PLACE TO LIVE (1988).
15. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, CURRENT HOUSING
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE FEDERAL RESPONSES (1988) [hereinafter CBO STUDY].
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provides disturbing data on three categories of "housing problems:"
affordability, physical deterioration of existing dwellings and crowd-
ing.I6 While one-third of the households in America suffered from at
least one of these problems in 1985, high housing costs relative to
income overshadowed the other two.' 7 Perhaps most troubling is the
fact that nearly seventy percent of those households in the lowest in-
come category are spending more than thirty percent of their income
on housing.'
Affordability is a problem that affects those attempting to buy
housing units and those seeking a decent place to rent, as well as those
Americans simply attempting to escape homelessness. The State of
the Nation's Housing, a policy study prepared by Harvard's Joint
Center for Housing Studies, notes that "[n]ationwide, the cash cost of
owning the representative home was $7,720 [in 1987], or 32.4 percent
of the estimated median income of potential first-time homebuyers
.... ,19 The picture was equally bleak for the nation's renters - a
median gross rent of $4,368 annually, "represen[ting] almost 30 per-
cent of the median income of all renters." 20 Although the Northeast
and West feature the heaviest "cash cost burden of homeowner-
ship,"' 2' in every region such burdens have increased significantly
since the early 1970s.2
The steadily rising after-tax cost of homeownership is especially
troublesome for young families seeking to buy their first home. For
example, from 1974 to 1987, annual income (measured in real terms)
for households headed by those age twenty-five to thirty-four fell from
$27,366 to $24,230.23 Not surprisingly, the percentage of homeown-
ers in this key age group has markedly declined - for those aged
twenty-five to twenty-nine, from 43.6 percent in 1973 to 35.9 percent
in 1987 and for those aged thirty to thirty-four, from 60.2 percent to
16. Id. According to the definitions used by the CBO researchers, "more than two
persons per bedroom" constitutes crowding, while affordability problems occur when oc-
cupants of a household pay more than thirty percent of their income on housing costs.
Id.
17. Id. at 9-10. In more than one-quarter of American households, occupants paid
more than thirty percent of income on housing (eleven percent paid more than one-half).
Seven percent of the housing units were in need of rehabilitation and three percent of the
populace experienced crowding. Id. at 10.
18. Id. at 9. "A four-person household is classified as very-low income if its income is
less than or equal to 50 percent of the area's median income. Threshold incomes are
adjusted for family size." Id. at 12.
19. NATION'S HOUSING, supra note 1, at 10.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 21-22.
23. Id. at 7.
1991] 549
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII
53.2 percent.24
Renters have been hit particularly hard by the gap in the supply of
affordable housing. Gross rents, adjusted for inflation, are at their
highest levels in twenty years, despite a sharp rise in rental vacan-
cies. 25 A rise in real rents and a decline in the median income of
renters (measured in constant dollars) have contributed to a serious
tenant squeeze: in 1985, forty-two percent of all renters (more than
twelve million persons) earmarked more than thirty percent of their
pre-tax incomes for housing. 26 Some tenants are at great risk. For
example, for single parents in the twenty-five to thirty-four age group,
falling median income (from over $10,000 in 1974 to just over $7000
in 1987, measured in 1986 dollars)27 and rising rental payments (in-
creasing from $319 to $354 during the same period)2" translate into a
gross rent burden in 1987 of 58.4 percent, up 13.5 percent over the
thirteen-year span.29 As this burden increases, these and other Amer-
icans, more than five million of whom are poverty-level renters,30 face
the dim, but too real prospect of homelessness.
Many of the nation's homeless, a group now numbered in the mil-
lions,3' simply cannot locate affordable rental housing:
Gradually, it is becoming clear that the problem of the "new
homelessness" is not primarily caused by personal pathologies such
as mental illness or alcoholism. Homelessness is primarily an eco-
nomic problem: in large metropolitan areas, many households
simply cannot find affordable housing at the bottom of the rental
24. Id. at 7, 12.
25. Id. at 5.
26. CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 16-17.
27. NATION'S HOUSING, supra note 1, at 15 (Exhibit 18: "Changes in Rental Burden
for Selected Household Types").
28. Id. at 27 (Appendix Table 11: "Rent Burden by Age and Family Type"). These
are Gross Rent figures, defined as: "contract Rent plus fuel and utilities, property taxes
and insurance." Id. at 20 n.3.
29. Id. at 15 (Exhibit 18). "Gross rent burden" is defined as "the ratio of median rent
to income." Id. at 14.
30. Id. at 19.
31. "While precise numbers are inherently difficult to derive, informed estimates put
the national figure somewhere around 2 million people, and growing." CRITICAL PER-
SPECTiVES ON HOUSING xvii (R. Bratt, C. Hartman & A. Meyerson eds. 1986) [hereinaf-
ter CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES] (citations omitted). "In the spring of 1984, HUD issued a
study estimating the number of homeless at from 250,000 to 350,000, a figure drastically
below previous estimates .... Critics charged political motivations . . . and shoddy
methodology." Id. at 20 n.3 (citation omitted).
A November 1988 U.S. General Accounting Office study stated that "[a]s many as 3
million people in the United States may be homeless, and most studies agree that the
number is growing rapidly, especially among families with children." GAO STUDY,
supra note 13, at 11.
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market. As a result they are forced onto the streets. 32
In some large cities, housing authorities collect back as many as half
of the housing vouchers they distribute, "because adequate, afforda-
ble, rental units cannot be found. '33
Even though federal spending on housing has grown significantly
over the past two decades,34 only a small fraction of eligible lower
income households have been program participants/beneficiaries.
Fewer than one-third of renter households with annual incomes below
$5,000, and not more than one in four households in the $5,000 to
$10,000 range, received any rental assistance in 1987.3" Indeed, using
the federal government's poverty definitions, "only 2.1 million (or 28
percent) of the nation's 7.5 million poverty-level renter households
lived in public housing or other subsidized rental housing [in
1987]. "36
The impact of this shortage in supply upon those teetering on the
edge of homelessness is profound. No less significant is the impact of
the dwindling federal governmental housing presence on low- and
moderate-income households attempting to secure safe, modern, and
affordable rental stock, or to acquire ownership of a home for the first
time. Over the past few decades the federal government, primarily
through the programs managed and administered at HUD, has at-
tempted to improve the state of the nation's housing in two basic
ways: by means of direct spending programs (chiefly subsidies for
lower-income households, such as rental assistance) 37 and through in-
32. Swanstrom, No Room at the Inn: Housing Policy and the Homeless, 35 WASH.
U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 81, 81 (1989).
33. CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 31, at xiii.
34. "By any measure, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974
sparked a major expansion in the number of households receiving rental assistance." NA-
TION'S HoUSING, supra note 1, at 17; see Housing and Community Development Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 201, 88 Stat. 633 (1974). The 1987 total for those living in
public housing or federally subsidized housing climbed nearly seventy-three percent from
the 1974 level. NATION'S HOUSING, supra note 1, at 17.
35. NATION'S HOUSING, supra note 1, at 17. This is still a marked advance over the
1974 figures (less than seventeen percent for both income groups). Id.
36. Id. at 18.
37. CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 2-3. The Congressional Budget Office study pro-
vides a helpful graphic representation of HUD and Farmers Home Administration
(FmHA) rental assistance and homeownership assistance programs. It lists twelve his-
toric and extant project-based rental programs, including public housing (authorized in
1937), the Section 8 New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation program, Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 201, 88 Stat. 633, 653
(1974), and Housing Development Grants (HoDAG), Housing and Urban-Rural Recov-
ery Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 301, 97 Stat. 1155, 1196 (1983). The two (active)
household-based programs are New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation Pro-
gram and Section 8 Existing-Housing Certificates, Housing and Community Develop-
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direct assistance (tax expenditures such as interest deductions for
homeowners, mortgage insurance and guarantee programs, and sec-
ondary mortgage market participation).38
Direct housing assistance is not provided as an entitlement; instead
the form and amount of subsidies, and the type and number of house-
holds to be included, are subject to constant revision by Congress and
to the prejudices of each succeeding administration. Budgetary con-
straints and shifting priorities can have a profound effect on direct
assistance:
[Recent] measures have included a dramatic slowdown in the rate
at which assistance is expanding, virtual elimination of expensive
types of assistance provided through new construction programs,
increases in the out-of-pocket housing expenditures made by as-
sisted households, and more explicit targeting of available re-
sources toward a poorer segment of the population.39
From 1981 to 1986, funding for HUD's low-income housing pro-
grams dropped from $30.17 billion to $9.97 billion; during the first six
years of the 1980s, subsidized housing starts plummeted from 183,011
to 17,080.40
When the problems of affordability noted here are combined with
concerns over mortgage availability, substandard housing conditions,
overcrowding, and racial and ethnic segregation, the challenges faced
by HUD (and by the state and local housing agencies that have in-
creasingly been called upon to fill the gap caused by the Reagan Ad-
ministration's withdrawal from the housing arena)41 may well appear
ment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 201, 88 Stat. 633, 653 (1974) and Section 8
Vouchers, Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 207,
97 Stat. 1155, 1181 (1983). The two homeownership assistance programs are the Rural
Housing Loans (Section 502 Rural Housing Loans), Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No.
81-171, § 502, 63 Stat. 413, 433 (1949), and Mortgage-Interest Subsidies (Section 235
Mortgage-Interest Subsidies), Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-448, § 101, 82 Stat. 476, 477 (1968) (authorized in 1968, for which no new funds were
appropriated in fiscal year 1989). See id. at 30-35 (Table 7: "Overview of Major Federal
Programs for Direct Housing Assistance in Chronological Order").
For a helpful summary of programs introduced, revised and eliminated by the Cran-
ston-Gonzalez Act, see Special Report, [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep.
(BNA) 580 (Nov. 12, 1990).
38. CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 5-6.
39. Id. at 1.
40. Swanstrom, supra note 32, at 94. Contrast these figures with the foregone reve-
nues attributable to various forms of indirect assistance. Even after the enactment of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, with its restrictions on deductibility, it is estimated that the
mortgage interest and property tax deductions will account for more than $38 billion in
tax expenditures in 1989. CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 4.
41. See, e.g., NASULGC, supra note 8.
An invigorated federal housing commitment must stress partnership with state
HUD AND HOUSING IN THE 1990s
insurmountable.
III. The Newsworthy Housing Crisis: HUD Underfunded and
Under Attack
HUD under the administration of Secretary Samuel Pierce has
become part of the American vocabulary. It is synonymous with
rampant abuse, favoritism, and mismanagement....
The tragedy of the "HUD Scandal" is that programs established
to provide decent and affordable housing for the poor and lower-
income families became a federal assistance program for ex-HUD
officials and so-called consultants.42
Given the fact that decent, affordable housing is still out of reach
for large numbers of the nation's lower-income households, it is
doubly disturbing that the federal government's lead agency in the
crucial realm of housing should be enmeshed in an imbroglio that,
since the spring of 1989, has received increasing attention on newspa-
per pages and radio and television news broadcasts. The extent of this
second housing crisis was first revealed to the American public
through news accounts of HUD Inspector General Paul A. Adams's
scathing appraisal of the Department's shoddy - even scandalous -
administration of the Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Program
and local governments and the private and nonprofit sectors. These groups
have proven themselves innovative and successful housing providers. Since
1980, more than 100 housing programs have been instituted by states using
state funds. Foundations such as the Local Initiatives Support Corporation and
the Enterprise Foundation have provided assistance .... Thousands of neigh-
borhood and nonprofit groups have participated in rehabilitation and other
housing activities. From Boston to Chicago to Dallas, scores of housing "part-
nerships" bring together these government, business, and nonprofit
organizations.
Id. at 70 (footnote omitted). See also A. STEGMAN & J. HOLDEN, NON-FEDERAL Hous-
ING PROGRAMS (1987).
The Cranston-Gonzalez Act includes within its purposes "to extend and strengthen
partnerships among all levels of government and the private sector, including for-profit
and nonprofit organizations, in the production and operation of housing affordable to
low-income and moderate-income families." Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 103(3), 104 Stat.
4079, 4085 (1990). The drafters found that "an increasing number of States and local
governments have been successful in producing cost-effective low-income and moderate-
income housing by working in partnership with the private sector, including nonprofit
community development corporations, community action agencies, neighborhood hous-
ing services corporations, trade unions, groups sponsored by religious organizations, lim-
ited equity cooperatives, and other tenant organizations .... " Pub. L. No. 101-625,
§ 202(10), 104 Stat. 4079, 4094 (1990). The HOME Investment Partnerships and Com-
munity Housing Partnership, authorized by Title II of the Cranston-Gonzalez Act are
the key tools designed to invigorate this local-state-federal partnership. Pub. L. No. 101-
625, § l(a), 104 Stat. 4079, 4079 (1990).
42. REPORT, supra note 2, at 111-12.
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(MRP). 3
Through this program, first authorized in 1978," HUD paid the
difference between the actual rents collected for the modestly rehabili-
tated units (with a maximum of 125 percent of local fair market rent)
and payments made by the tenants. MRP was administered by local
public housing authorities (PHAs);45 as of 1987, 76,000 households
received assistance from this project-based program.46
The Inspector General's audit of April 26, 1989, provides the fol-
lowing description of the MRP process:
... HUD enters into Annual Contributions Contracts (ACC) with
PHAs who solicit applications from owners or developers and then
determine whether the units are feasible for inclusion in the
MRP....
For units determined eligible, the PHA and owners enter into an
Agreement to enter into a Housing Assistance Payments (AHAP)
Contract. When the units are rehabilitated and the work accepted
by the PHA, the Housing Assistance Payments (HAP) contract is
executed for a term of 15 years. The owner receives a contract rent
that is defined as the total rent including the rent paid by the
family.
The regulations specify a rent calculation involving a two-part pro-
cess. First, a Base Rent is established for each unit to be assisted,
using the rent or cost approach. The monthly amount necessary to
amortize an actual or imputed rehabilitation loan for the work to
be accomplished under the program is then added to the Base Rent
to obtain the Contract Rent. In its most basic form this process
can be illustrated as follows:
43. Moderate Rehabilitation Program, Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of
1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 301, 97 Stat. 1155, 1196 (1983). See, e.g., Ex-HUD Aides,
Others Apparently Used Inside Data to Win Pacts, Report Says, Wall St. J., Apr. 27, 1989,
at A 18, col. 2. See also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, AUDIT OF SECTION 8 MODERATE REHABILITATION PRO-
GRAM iii (1989) [hereinafter OIG AUDIT]:
Overall, we concluded that the MRP [the Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation
Program] was poorly managed. There was little or no documentation or ac-
countability for the PHAs selected by HUD Headquarters to receive funding
allocations. Moreover, PHAs selected developers without complying with the
need for an effective competitive selection process and oftentimes in violation of
their own Administrative Plans. There was an absence of clear, written policy
and guidelines.
Id.
44. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
45. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1947, 61 Stat. 954 (1947).
46. CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 32-33.
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Debt Service Rent
The fifteen years of subsidized rents, combined with the elimination
of, or restrictive budgeting for, federal housing aid during the Reagan
years made MRP a developer's plum that was hard to resist.48
The Wall Street Journal headline for its April 27, 1989 article is not
atypical of the initial accounts of the MRP scandal: "Ex-HUD Aides,
Others, Apparently Used Inside Data to Win Pacts, Report Says."
49
The story reported that "former HUD officials and well-connected
consultants apparently used 'inside information' to win lucrative rent
subsidy contracts for their clients." 50 Three prominent names were
among the list of those who benefited from MRP consulting work:
Frederick Bush, a major fund-raiser for President Bush's election
campaign and the President's choice for Ambassador to Luxembourg
(whose firm received $195,000 from a Puerto Rican developer); Ed-
ward Brooke, former United States Senator from Massachusetts (who
collected $183,000); and James Watt, Ronald Reagan's outspoken,
controversial Interior Secretary (who picked up $300,000 for "talking
to the 'right people' ,,).51 HUD Secretary Jack Kemp's response was
swift and decisive: he canceled MRP subsidies for 1989 that had not
yet been announced.2
According to the Inspector General's audit, a critical factor con-
tributing to the favoritism that dominated MRP awards was HUD's
decision beginning in fiscal year (FY) 1983 to abandon fair-share pro-
47. OIG AUDIT, supra note 43, at 1-2.
48. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 10 ("The mod rehab program... became in the
words of one developer 'the only game in town' as these increasingly scarce funds were
much in demand.")
49. Wall St. J., Apr. 27, 1989, at A18, col. 2.
50. Id.
51. Id. See also REPORT, supra note 2, at 20-24 ("Essex, Maryland Project - Get-
ting Watt You Paid For"), 64-66.
52. Wall St. J., Apr. 27, 1989, at A18, col. 3. On October 3, 1989, Kemp "announced
a series of proposals to 'clear the decks' at his scandal-ridden department by eliminating
virtually all discretionary spending in Federal housing programs." N.Y. Times, Oct. 4,
1989, at A20, col. 5. See [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 1034, 1034-
35 (May 1, 1989) ("In nearly every instance, HUD accepted the OIG's findings, agreed to
its recommendations, and developed an aggressive schedule for implementing the recom-
mended changes.").
Section 127 of the Department of Housing and Urban Development Reform Act of
1989 (HUD Reform Act of 1989) corrects many of the flaws of the MRP; the Act in-
cludes, for example, a provision that limits annual units to no more than one hundred per
project. Pub. L. No. 101-235, § 127, 103 Stat. 1987, 2025-26 (1989).
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cedures in favor of a system of discretionary funding.5 3 The results
were inequitable and suspect:
Only about 204 PHAs received funding allocations during the five-
year period [January 1, 1984 through November 30, 1988].
Ten States received over 51 percent of all units whereas their fair-
share needs percentage, as developed by HUD, was only about 16
percent, a difference of 35 percent.
Fifteen PHAs received more than four allocations during the pe-
riod. The allocations consumed over 33 percent of all units
allocated.
Former HUD officials and employees actively sought and partici-
pated as developers, consultants or lender representatives in over
55 projects.5 4
These and other improprieties and abuses are costly as well: the In-
spector General has estimated total excess housing assistance during
the MRP's fifteen-year contract terms to be over $413 million for
projects funded during the period covered by the audit.55
In succeeding months, through news accounts and the investiga-
tions of a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Op-
erations,56 the nation has learned that the initial accounts of MRP
irregularities revealed but the tip of the iceberg. What follows is a
partial list of the difficulties facing HUD officials past and present:
53. See QIG AUDIT, supra note 43, at 5 ("Management officials used the alternative
informal and undocumented discretionary methods to allocate funding based on a verbal
opinion of the General Counsel."); see also REPORT, supra note 2, at 12 ("Thus, an oral
opinion by HUD General Counsel Knapp which in fact was never uttered seems to have
taken on a life of its own, and supposedly became the basis of all kinds of decisions by
people at HUD, including Secretary Pierce."). But see N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1989, at A10,
col. 1 ("A former general counsel for the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment told a House subcommittee today that he never rendered the legal opinion that has
been cited as the basis for discretionary awards of millions of dollars in Federal housing
subsidies.").
54. QIG AUDIT, supra note 43, at 6 (citations to appendices omitted).
55. Id. at i. Incorrect rent calculations alone accounted for excess assistance totaling
more than $58.8 million. Id. See also REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
56. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
The HUD Inspector General's report triggered a series of hearings and a
lengthy investigation by the Employment and Housing Subcommittee on
abuses, favoritism and mismanagement in HUD programs during the adminis-
tration of HUD Secretary Samuel R. Pierce, Jr.
The subcommittee's investigation of what came to be commonly referred to
as the "HUD Scandal," became one of the major Congressional investigations
of the 101st Congress. Over a period of 14 months beginning in May 1989, the
Employment and Housing Subcommittee held 27 hearings which lasted more
than 120 hours. Some 50 witnesses appeared before the subcommittee.
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1. The MRP scandal is much more widespread than first reported.
Inspector General Adams, requested by the Senate Committee on
Housing and Urban Affairs (one of several congressional panels ac-
tively investigating HUD improprieties) to widen his inquiry beyond
the seventy-three MRP projects studied initially, discovered that the
aggregate fees paid by developers to twenty well-connected consul-
tants exceeded $5.7 million. 7 Key names added to the high-paid con-
sultants list include Carla Hills, former HUD Secretary and currently
United States Trade Representative (more than $130,000); Joseph
Strauss, former Special Assistant to HUD Secretary Samuel Pierce
(about $1.7 million); and Bill Taylor, former chair of the Florida Re-
publican Party ($146,000)."' The General Accounting Office (GAO)
has revealed that in several projects, developers who put little money
into projects made profits that greatly exceeded costs associated with
acquiring and rehabilitating the properties.59
2. Secretary Pierce's competence, management style, and integrity
have become the focus of increased scrutiny and criticism. Pierce, the
only department chief to remain in office through both of President
Reagan's terms, struggled not only with administration officials bent
on dismantling his housing portfolio, but also with a nickname -
"Silent Sam" - that somewhat unfairly marked him as aloof and un-
responsive. 60 In testimony before the House Government Operations
Subcommittee on Employment and Housing (chaired by California
Democrat Tom Lantos) (Lantos Subcommittee), the former Secretary
admitted, "[p]erhaps we could have watched the [MRP] closer than
we did.''61 Pierce, however, refused to accept the blame laid at his
feet by former aides, particularly his executive assistant, Deborah
Gore Dean.62
As reporters and government investigators focused more attention
on MRP abuses, Ms. Dean emerged as a leading figure in the HUD
tragedy: "An ambitious young woman from a wealthy, well-con-
nected family, [Dean] used contacts to get into government and, like
many other relatively obscure officials in Washington who became in-
57. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1989, at A16, col. 4.
58. Id. See also REPORT, supra note 2, at 41, 87, 105-06.
59. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1989, at A16, col. 5.
60. See N.Y. Times, June 18, 1989, at Al, col. 5. "Mr. Pierce... has argued that the
'Silent Sam' nickname was deeply unfair. In an interview with The New York Times in
January, he said it was the product of his refusal to see the press in his first three months
in office while he 'studied the hell out of these programs.'" Id. at A22, col. 3.
61. Wall St. J., May 26, 1989, at A12, col. 4.
62. N.Y. Times, May 26, 1989, at Al, col. 3.
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fluential, built a career by cloaking herself in the power of her boss."''
A "dramatic turn in the Congressional investigation" occurred on
June 13, as Dean, who feared she was becoming a "scapegoat,"'" re-
fused to testify before the same House subcommittee, invoking her
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.6"
In the weeks following Dean's refusal, evidence surfaced that indi-
cates that Pierce did play a more active role in MRP decision-making
than he first indicated." In mid-July, Shirley McVay Wiseman, the
former Acting Assistant Secretary of Housing, testified that "Mr.
Pierce called her in 1985 and told her to provide multimillion-dollar
rent subsidies to a project in Durham, North Carolina, that was being
promoted by a former law associate of his."' 67 Within three weeks, the
New York Times would report "that for friends and political allies,
including Republican congressional candidates facing tough election
fights, Mr. Pierce and his department were available, and often eager,
to help."'68
Apparently, the Secretary had contact (through phone calls, inter-
views, and personal correspondence) regarding potential HUD
projects with the most prominent consultants already named in the
wide-ranging inquiry - Senator Brooke, Secretary Hills, and Secre-
tary Watt - as well as with such other luminaries as Senator Strom
Thurmond (Republican from South Carolina), Representative Barney
Frank (Democrat from Massachusetts), and Secretary of Defense
63. N.Y. Times, May 31, 1989, at A19, col. 1.
64. Wall St. J., June 12, 1989, at A16, col. 1.
65. N.Y. Times, June 14, 1989, at A1, col. 1. "While Ms. Dean wielded tremendous
power and influence as Secretary Pierce's top aide at HUD, and was certainly a key
player in the mod rehab funding game, it remains an open question whether Ms. Dean
was the power broker or was acting as an agent for the Secretary." REPORT, supra note
2, at 87-88.
66. The following exchange occurred during questioning of HUD Deputy Assistant
Secretary DuBois Gilliam by counsel for the Lantos Subcommittee:
COUNSEL. About a year ago, when the subcommittee started this investiga-
tion of HUD, I likened the situation at HUD to "Let's Make A Deal," with
Secretary Pierce behind Door No. 1, Deborah Dean behind Door No. 2, and
Tom Demery behind Door No. 3, and remarked that the open question was
"who was the big dealer." My question to you is, based on your personal exper-
iences and observations, who was the big dealer at HUD?
Mr. GILLIAM. Door No. 1.
COUNSEL. That's Secretary Pierce?
Mr. GILLIAM. That's correct.
REPORT, supra note 2, at 67-68 (citation omitted).
67. N.Y. Times, July 15, 1989, at Al, col. 4.
68. N.Y. Times, August 4, 1989, at Al, col. 1. The MRP and the HUD Secretary's
discretionary fund for special projects also assisted members of the loyal opposition, as
evidenced by this headline: Democrats, Too, Benefited from H. U.D. Programs. N.Y.
Times, August 13, 1989, at A26, col. 3.
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Caspar W. Weinberger.69 The HUD scandal was swiftly moving from
indications of lax management to allegations of influence peddling at
the highest levels of government. When Pierce refused to testify on
September 26, 1989, citing his fifth and sixth amendment rights, frus-
trated congressional investigators suggested that criminality, and not
mere negligence or mismanagement, may have tainted HUD's inner
circle. 0 When, a month later, Pierce refused once again to offer testi-
mony, nineteen House Democrats asked Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh to appoint an independent prosecutor; on February 1,
1990, Thornburgh announced that he would seek an independent
counsel to investigate possible illegality in the administration of the
MRP between 1984 and 1988 by Pierce and other high-ranking HUD
officials. 7
In early January 1991, Arlin M. Adams, the former federal judge
who was selected as independent counsel in March 1990, received au-
thorization to expand his inquiry to include questions concerning
whether "Pierce lied to Congress and violated the law in dealings with
his former law firm and former executive assistant [Lance Wilson]." '72
The three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia charged with overseeing the investigation ac-
ceded to the request of the Lantos Subcommittee as seconded by the
Justice Department in August 1990.73
3. It has become apparent that mismanagement and abdication of
69. N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1989, at Al, col. 1. See also Pierce May Have Kept Hands
Off, but Projects of Pals Sailed Through, Wall St. J., July 12, 1989, at AI, col. 1; H. U.D.
Approved Subsidies After [the Colorado brewer Joseph] Coors Wrote the Chief, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 24, 1989, at Al, col. 1; Pierce Helped His Old Law Firm on H. U.D. Requests,
Files Show, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1989, at Al, col. 1; HUD Provided $4.3 Million for
Project Backed by Pierce's Old Firm, Ex-Clients, Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 1989, at A18, col. 5.
70. Wall St. J., Sept. 27, 1989, at 24, col. 1. "In his opening statement yesterday, Mr.
Pierce, who had been subpoenaed by the subcommittee after refusing to appear volunta-
rily Sept. 15, complained that his lawyers haven't had sufficient time to review 48 boxes of
HUD documents and other material he said may be relevant." Id.
71. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1990, at 12, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
Predictably, Pierce's attorney proclaimed his client's innocence, while some members of
Congress complained that the Department of Justice inquiry was too narrow. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 3, 1990, at 12, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
72. Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 1991, at A5, col. 5. See also REPORT, supra note 2, at 3
(describing subcommittee's detailed request to Judge Adams); N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1991,
at A14, col. 1 ("The court also added the multifamily housing co-insurance program...
to the moderate rehabilitation program and other H.U.D. programs already under
investigation.").
73. Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 1991, at A5, col. 1. In August 1990, the court had permitted
Judge Adams to investigate the UDAG, Housing and Community Development Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, § 110, 91 Stat. 1111, 1125 (1977), technical assistance, and
special projects programs, in addition to the MRP. Id. See also REPORT, supra note 2, at
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responsibility were not confined to the administration of the MRP dur-
ing the Pierce years at HUD. Hundreds of millions of dollars have
been misspent, lost, and wasted, particularly in government insurance
and co-insurance programs instituted or reformed to meet the Reagan
Administration's commitment to privatizing traditionally governmen-
tal functions. In early July 1989, as program after program joined the
dishonorable list, one high-ranking HUD official described the De-
partment's strategy as "'management triage':"
We've tried to determine how many patients there are in the emer-
gency room. Now we need to know how badly each is injured and
start treating them. When we finish we can move on to things like
simple inefficiency and waste. It's a gigantic workload.74
Secretary Kemp's July 1989 reckoning that the various HUD scan-
dals combined would cost a budget-obsessed federal government two
billion dollars now seems quite conservative, even wishful 
7
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) co-insurance program
losses alone have been projected to reach the one billion dollar level,
according to Price Waterhouse auditors hired by federal officials to
examine the troubled program.76 In 1983, the government inaugu-
rated a system of spreading mortgage insurance risks between the
FHA (roughly eighty-one percent) and private co-insurers (nineteen
percent)." The idea was to delegate the responsibility for overseeing
the underwriting tasks, credit checks, and property appraisals to the
private "partner. '78 Unfortunately, a significant portion of the huge
co-insurance losses can be attributed to "some lenders' practice of
vastly overvaluing property that was being mortgaged. ' 79 In the
event of default, the lender co-insurer, who had already received in-
flated servicing fees tied to the size of the mortgage, could still profit
from the deal even after deducting its twenty-percent share of insur-
ance costs. Co-insurance from just one such partner - DRG Fund-
ing Corporation - has already resulted in $55 million in government
losses, according to Inspector General Adams. 0
74. N.Y. Times, July 7, 1989, at Al, col. 1, All, col. 1 (quoting Alfred A. DelliBovi,
HUD Under Secretary).
75. Wall St. J., July 12, 1989, at A3, col. 4; N.Y. Times, July 12, 1989, at B5, col. 1;
REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. Cf N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1989, at Al, col. 6 (GAO audit
performed by Price Waterhouse estimated FHA losses (some attributable to mismanage-
ment) at $4.2 billion in 1988).
76. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
77. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 37.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1989, at Al, col. 1, A20, col. 2. See REPORT, supra note 2,
at 37 (Inspector General estimate that losses attributable to DRG will reach $370 mil-
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Adding insult to this significant injury is alarming evidence of wide-
spread "equity skimming" involving FHA loans, particularly in the
recession-plagued West and Southwest."' "Buyers" assume a number
of federally insured mortgages and pay no down payment (the sellers
are thankful to get out from under the home), then lease the homes.
The fraudulent landlord fails to make mortgage payments, but several
months typically pass before lenders actually foreclose. The landlord
pockets the rent during the interim and HUD is left to foot the bill for
the FHA-insured loans.8 2 HUD investigators estimate losses totalling
hundreds of millions of dollars. 83
The list of programs in which HUD and the Department of Justice
investigators have uncovered abuses continues to grow. Within one
week, Secretary Kemp announced the suspension of two mortgage
programs. On June 29, 1989, Kemp revealed plans to end the Title X
FHA Land Development Mortgage Insurance Program.84 A fairly
modest program begun in 1965 (in some years as few as two loans
were originated), Title X has cost the federal government $90 million
in losses since 1977, according to HUD estimates.8 5 However, losses
are not the only concern with the program. A 1986 audit of seventeen
projects disclosed that all but one had housing " 'not affordable under
Title X guidelines,'" including the Desert Falls Country Club in
Palm Desert, California, a (defaulting) development featuring a golf
course, clubhouse, pools, tennis courts, and spa. 6
lion). In January 1990, Secretary Kemp eliminated the co-insurance program, labeling it
"structurally flawed and fundamentally unsound as well as administratively unfixable";
in its place the Department will return "to a full insurance program for multifamily
projects, performing mortgage approval functions in-house and assuming 100 percent of
any losses." Id. at 32-43. See also Pub. L. No. 101-235, § 139, 103 Stat. 1987, 2029
(1989) (Co-Insurance Amendments).
81. See Wall St. J., June 19, 1989, at A5, col. 1.
82. Id. at A5, cols. 1-2.
83. Id. at A5, col. 1.
84. [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 139 (July 10, 1989):
The Title X program, which authorizes HUD to provide mortgage insurance
for land acquisition, off-site costs, site improvements, and other fees, is designed
to aid private developers to acquire and develop land for residential and related
uses, including facilities for public or common use.
Id.
85. Id. at 139-40. In August, HUD published a proposed rule designed to terminate
the program. See [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 253, 253 (Aug. 21,
1989) ("The rule may hit a roadblock, though, since several House housing subcommittee
members have questioned HUD's authority to terminate a statutorily authorized
program.").
86. N.Y. Times, June 30, 1989, at Al, col. 7, A10, col. 5. See also Report of Housing
and Urban Development Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-235, § 133, 103 Stat.
1987, 2027 (1989) (repealing Title X program).
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In the Retirement Service Centers program, officials approved the
underwriting of millions of dollars of mortgages to finance the con-
struction of community centers for the elderly "before determining
whether there was an adequate demand for them.""7 Half of the cen-
ters studied in the Midwest were either in default or in financial dis-
tress; at stake are more than $120 million in mortgages."8 When
announcing suspension of the program on July 6, 1989, Kemp com-
mented, "'[tihis is a program that should serve low-income people
but instead is serving upper- and middle-income persons - and doing
it very poorly at that.' "89
4. Private parties contracting with HUD have been engaging in
highly lucrative illegal activities. In June 1989, the national press car-
ried alarming reports that private escrow agents have allegedly em-
bezzled several million dollars that should have been paid to the
federal government following sales of homes (purchased with the
assistance of government-guaranteed loans) that HUD had acquired
through foreclosure. 90 Investigators were shocked at the Depart-
ment's negligent supervision:
"The laxity of oversight by H.U.D. was frightening," said an inves-
tigator involved in the joint effort between the housing department
and the Justice Department. "Nobody noticed, nobody cared, that
the money wasn't coming in. These private agents apparently felt
after a while they had carte blanche to keep it."'91
In Baltimore, a federal grand jury was evaluating the United States
Attorney's case against Marilyn L. Harrell, an escrow agent dubbed
"Robin HUD" who has admitted to diverting more than five million
87. N.Y. Times, June 8, 1989, at B9, col 1.
88. Id. See also N.Y. Times, July 4, 1989, at A6, col. 1 (HUD audit cited a Minneap-
olis project that received federal assistance even though the site, located near a large
gravel pit, "was clearly remote from major population centers and any concentration of
elderly persons").
89. N.Y. Times, July 7, 1989, at Al, col. 1. One program-assisted project in Palm
Beach featured two-bedroom units with a monthly rental of $2,100! Id. at All, col. 4.
Apparently, such mis-targeting was legion. An audit of the Discretionary Loan Manage-
ment Set-Aside Program (LMSA), whereby Section 8 units are targeted to stave off fore-
closure of FHA-insured projects, has revealed that almost half of the assisted projects
studied were not eligible for the program. N.Y. Times, June 29, 1989, at B6, col. 1.
"Representative Bill Green, a Manhattan Republican, said he was convinced after exam-
ining the report and interviewing investigators that 'regulations for picking recipients
objectively were ignored and recipients were picked instead on the basis of favoritism.'"
Id. at B6, cols. 2-3. See also [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 1082,
1082-1083 (May 15, 1989).
90. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 11, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
91. Id. at Al, col. 1; A30, col. 1.
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dollars intended for the government to charity.9 2 According to one
account, Harrell "used H.U.D. money to buy 20 homes and nearly 40
automobiles for needy people in the suburbs of Washington." '93 In
June 1990, Harrell pled guilty to embezzlement charges; she received
a prison term of three years and ten months and was ordered to pay
$600,000 in restitution.94
Evidently, Secretary Pierce's "hands-off" management style has
been replicated in local HUD offices throughout the country. On
June 15, a Justice Department spokesman announced that Attorney
General Thornburgh had ordered the nation's ninety-four United
States Attorneys to investigate all local HUD offices for evidence of
fraud and embezzlement.95 Secretary Kemp, who had requested a
criminal investigation two days before, was instituting additional in-
house and independent reviews of MRP contracts and sales of govern-
ment property.96
5. Many ex-HUD officials evidently have parlayed their experience
in the Department into profitable private sector activities in the housing
area. Most prominent on the list of program beneficiaries (after the
waiting period prescribed by federal law) is the Winn Group, an as-
sortment of partnerships involving four former HUD officials that
renovated more than thirteen hundred housing units located in seven
MRP projects in the West. 97 When one member of the group was
testifying before the Lantos Subcommittee in June 1989, the chairman
observed, "'Many of these units were awarded to you because of your
pre-existing relationship with high-ranking H.U.D. officials.' "t98
Lantos's Republican colleague, Connecticut Representative Christo-
pher Shays was more colorful: "'They were involved in a dirty,
smelly, slimy business, and they made millions off the taxpayers be-
cause of their special relationship with the agency.' "99
One member of the Winn Group took his HUD connections to
92. REPORT, supra note 2, at 34.
93. N.Y. Times, June 11, 1989, § 1, at 30, col. 1; see also N.Y. Times, June 17, 1989,
at AI, col. 6, A8, cols. 1-2.
94. REPORT, supra note 2, at 36. See also id. at 36 n.29 (listing other closing agents
prosecuted for embezzlement).
95. N.Y. Times, June 16, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
96. Id.
97. N.Y. Times, July 14, 1989, at AI, col. 1. The group consisted of Philip D. Winn,
formerly Assistant Secretary for Housing and currently the Ambassador to Switzerland;
Philip Abrams, a past Under Secretary at HUD; J. Michael Queenan, a housing official in
HUD's Denver office; and Lance H. Wilson, Deborah Gore Dean's predecessor as Secre-
tary Pierce's top aide. Id. at AI, col. 1, B5, col. 2. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 94-98.
98. N.Y. Times, July 14, 1989, at B5, col. 2.
99. Id.
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Wall Street. Rumors of favoritism and influence-peddling have re-
sulted in an internal investigation at PaineWebber Group, Inc., where
Lance Wilson, Samuel Pierce's former executive assistant, was hired
as a first vice president in the firm's Municipal Securities Group."o
The brokerage concern's HUD-related activities increased substan-
tially once Wilson joined PaineWebber in early 1986 (two years after
leaving HUD), causing government investigators and members of
Congress to question the propriety of Wilson's more recent contacts
with HUD. 101
The company's own inquiry was prompted in part by questions
raised by HUD's selection of PaineWebber as financial adviser for the
Department's sale of $400 million in government securities, a job po-
tentially worth $1.3 million to the company. 102 Although an advisory
panel had recommended selection of Chemical Bank, HUD under
Secretary Carl Covitz chose PaineWebber. Though Covitz denies any
lobbying by Wilson, there is no question that the former top aide "was
actively involved in PaineWebber's proposal."10 3 Wilson has report-
edly made millions of dollars in investment returns and consulting
fees since leaving the inner circles of HUD. °4 On September 28,
1989, Wilson, like his former boss the day before, invoked his consti-
tutional rights and refused to answer questions posed by Representa-
tive Lantos's subcommittee. 5
Unfortunately, Wilson's case, though extreme in terms of influence
and profit, is by no means unique.10 6 The revolving door at HUD was
apparently well-oiled and unguarded."17
100. REPORT, supra note 2, at 99.
101. Id. at 103-05.
102. Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 1989, at A14, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1989, at A10, col.
1.
103. Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 1989, at A14, col. 5; How HUD Aide Used Ties to Help
Himself Later Paine Webber: Lance Wilson Made a Fortune on Housing Deal, Opened
Doors for Wall Street Firm, Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
104. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
105. Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1989, at All, col. 1, B5, col. 2.
106. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 2, at 93-111 ("HUD Alumni"); Wall St. J., July 31,
1989, at A12, col. 1; N.Y. Times, July 29, 1989, at Al, col. 4: "Joseph Monticciolo, the
housing agency's New York regional administrator from 1981 to 1988, told a Congres-
sional committee investigating political favoritism at H.U.D., 'I made recommendations
to Washington that ultimately benefited people who are partners of mine now.'" Id.
107. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 93.
While HUD was part of the 'revolving door' between Government and industry
with HUD officials leaving the agency to work as housing consultants and de-
velopers, it appears that the door at HUD was always open to former HUD
officials.
Id. Cf Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, § 101, 103 Stat. 1716 (1989)
("Restrictions on Postemployment Activities").
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6. The Reagan Administration's aggressive stance against "tradi-
tional" federal housing strategies resulted not only in widespread cuts
but also in a significant waste of the taxpayers' money. At a time when
budget restraints cause belt-tightening throughout the federal bureau-
cracy, in one egregious case HUD decision-makers chose to pass up
savings estimated at more than $800 million rather than run the risk
of re-funding a mortgage subsidy program dating back to the years of
the Great Society.108
At issue were "Section 235 payments," first authorized in 1968,
whereby private lenders received interest rate subsidies to benefit low-
and moderate-income homebuyers who were unable to finance their
purchases at prevailing rates. 1°9 In February, 1987, the Inspector
General's office recommended that the subsidized borrowers be en-
couraged - through financial inducements - to refinance high-inter-
est loans written during the most recent periods of steep inflation. 10
Initial outlays of $33 million in the refinancing year would be much
more than offset by monthly savings of $5 million, according to De-
partment estimates."'
Despite Adams' urging, high-ranking HUD officials, including Sec-
retary Pierce, rejected the plan time and again. Unfortunately, it ap-
pears that politics won out over frugality:
One main reason the refinancing proposal was rejected was that
senior officials feared the money saved would be plowed back into
the subsidy program, which the Reagan administration wanted to
pare back. "The department has not pursued actions to refinance
high interest mortgages because of ... the possibility of savings
being used to fund new activity ([t]he department does not wish to
reactivate the . . .program)," a Feb. 25, 1987, report from the
inspector general said." 2
Zealous pursuit of ideological goals can indeed have a high price
tag.1
13
7. Congress shares some of the blame for the extent of the scandal
108. See Wall St. J., July 3, 1989, at A30, col. 1.
109. See CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 34-35 (Table 7).
110. Wall St. J., July 3, 1989, at A30, col. 1.
111. Id. at A30, cols. 1-2 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at A30, col. 1. "'They'd rather waste the money as a way to drain' the pro-
gram, a veteran HUD employee who was one of several department officials who had
suggested the refinancing plan, said in an interview." Id.
113. In Section 125 of the HUD Reform Act of 1989, Congress authorized the HUD
Secretary to refinance the Section 235 mortgages. Pub. L. No. 101-235, § 125, 103 Stat.
1987, 2022 (1989). "While such refinancing could have saved $840 million had it been
implemented a few years ago, it is estimated that it could still save almost $400 million."
See REPORT, supra note 2, at 7.
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and for failing to move more swiftly to halt the abuses. While there are
indications that HUD officials were less than forthcoming with infor-
mation sought by legislators regarding program irregularities, 14
members of Congress failed to act upon repeated warnings by the In-
spector General that much was amiss at HUD:
"There was plenty of evidence for those of us who had the respon-
sibility to get involved, and we just didn't do it," former Senator
William Proxmire, the Wisconsin Democrat who was chairman of
the H.U.D. Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Commit-
tee, said.. . . "Clearly, the reports did not get the attention they
deserved."115
In September, none of the six congressional panels charged with over-
seeing federal housing activities responded after HUD reported hun-
dreds of indictments and convictions growing out of HUD
programs.' 16
Some elected officials apparently played a more active role, benefit-
ing in significant ways from funding and other program decisions at
HUD. For example, projects favored by Senator Alfonse M.
D'Amato, a New York Republican who sits on two committees with
HUD oversight responsibilities, received "thumbs up" from depart-
ment officials during the Reagan years.117 Not surprisingly, several
housing industry participants, recognizing the Senator's influence at
HUD, responded with generous campaign contributions. 18
Although there have been no allegations of wrongdoing on the Sena-
tor's part (the same cannot be said of local HUD officials), such
marked favoritism toward one geographic area in times of severe pro-
gram restrictions - even elimination - raises serious questions about
the independence of a lucrative and sensitive part of the executive
branch.
Thus ends the sad compendium of travails facing HUD, Congress
and those who look to the federal government to solve, in whole or in
part, their own housing needs. By no means is the list presented here
a complete one. Now that the scope of the independent counsel's in-
114. Aides to Pierce Hid Much Data, Papers Indicate, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1989, at Al,
col. 5.
115. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1989, at A9, col. 1.
116. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1989, at A9, cols. 1, 3.
117. N.Y. Times, June 18, 1989, at A22, col. 1. "Almost a third, or $12 million, of the
nearly $38 million in a [HUD Secretary] discretionary fund... went to projects in New
York State between 1981 and 1988. And all but a small fraction of that went to causes
championed by [D'Amato]." Id.
118. H. UD. and D'Amato: Hopes for Grants Prompted Gifts, N.Y. Times, July 28,
1989, at Bl, col. 2.
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vestigation has widened considerably, a quick resolution to the HUD
Scandal is most unlikely. In fact, all evidence points to a long, slow
bleeding over the next several months.' 9 We can only hope that, un-
like the medicinal bleedings rendered centuries ago, the results will
not be fatal for the patient.
IV. Putting the Housing House in Order
This is neither the forum nor the time for offering full-blown solu-
tions. Conjoined with other weaknesses - such as public resistance
to low and moderately priced housing developments (that is,
"projects"), stigmatization of housing program participants, and seg-
regation of government assisted housing - the two crises introduced
here threaten even the most creative and well-intentioned strategy.
Instead, the author offers some tentative suggestions for beginning
what promises to be a long road to constructive reform and some pre-
dictions about the legal consequences of the HUD scandal.
First, any dramatic new federal housing programs, especially those
introduced by the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing
Act of 1990,20 should be put on hold until the problems that gave rise
to the HUD scandal are behind us. Secretary Kemp and Congress-
man Lantos are to be commended for responding energetically and
creatively to the wide-ranging predicament in which the Department,
the housing community, and the nation find themselves. 2' These
should be first steps, not final successes.
Precious resources, technical expertise, and energy should not yet
be shifted from investigation of the expansive scandal to implementa-
tion and promotion of substitute schemes. Instead, the President,
HUD Secretary and Congress should begin a serious investigation of
the intricate structural and governance difficulties faced by a cabinet
department characterized by wide-ranging responsibilities, seriously
inadequate funding and a long history of neglect, waste and abuse.
We do not need a new national task force to diagnose the nation's
119. Ex-Secretary Pierce is by no means admitting guilt: "Pierce's attorney, Paul L.
Perito, issued a statement saying: ... 'We are fully confident that, at the conclusion [of
the expanded investigation], the independent counsel will find Secretary Pierce did not
violate any federal laws or regulations.'" Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 1991, at AS, cols. 5-6.
120. Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 1, 104 Stat. 4079 (1990).
121. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-8 (noting the reforms already implemented
by HUD and Congress in the months since the HUD scandal story broke). The efforts to
rein in privatization, particularly in the escrow and co-insurance areas, are impressive.
Until evidence is forthcoming that these sensitive (and potentially lucrative) functions
can be performed relatively free from profiteering, lawmakers should continue to put this
aspect of the Reagan Revolution on hold.
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housing needs or to devise new programmatic panaceas; we should
instead focus expert attention on creating the proper administrative
structure and environment in which extant and future programs can
most effectively be designed and executed.122
Second, the White House should continue to send down the
message that influence-peddling, favoritism and lax management will
not be tolerated, indeed, that such acts and omissions will be pun-
ished. President Bush concluded his remarks made upon signing the
HUD Reform Act of 1989,123 by stating that "never again must we let
the programs of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
- or any other agency - be abused for political purposes or personal
gain."' 24 When the next set of housing abuses are revealed, the Presi-
dent ought to follow up this rhetoric with action.
Third, leaders of both parties should work to ensure greater longev-
ity for HUD programs. We have seen too many housing programs
tossed aside either after failing to yield immediate results, or following
changes in presidential administrations. The strong bi-partisan sup-
port for HUD reforms and for a new housing agenda, inspired in
large part by the widely perceived crisis in affordable housing and the
alarming growth in the number of homeless Americans, might tempo-
rarily counter such debilitating tendencies. There are no guarantees,
however, that this spirit of cooperation will survive when partisan
concerns drift elsewhere.
We can also begin to assess the poteptial impact of the HUD scan-
dal on the state of housing law as interpreted by judges and as crafted
by elected lawmakers. The notoriety of the scandal makes judicial
notice - de facto, if not de jure - of the sad state of affairs at HUD
122. The Lantos Subcommittee concluded that "[tlhere is a need to make HUD as an
institution less political without unduly infringing on the right of a HUD Secretary to
conduct policy and to have his or her team running the agency." REPORT, supra note 2,
at 8. Minority members dissented, however, from the specific recommendation "that all
Deputy Assistant Secretary positions at HUD should only be filled by HUD career em-
ployees." Id. at 113. Perhaps the problem is that HUD is not political enough. That is,
instead of asking the Bush Administration to sacrifice these sensitive executive positions
for the cause of technical expertise, Congress, for example, could encourage Secretary
Kemp to make an effort to fill these and other noncareer positions with senior state and
local officials from both parties who would bring-to the job technical housing and political
expertise. After all, the crisis in affordable housing has tended to blur the distinctions
between liberal and conservative approaches. Such a strategy might enhance the
survivability of HUD programs from one administration to the next and create an ample
pool of political appointees to move up the Department chain of command.
123. Department of Housing and Urban Development Reform Act of 1989 (HUD Re-
form Act of 1989), Pub. L. No. 101-235, 103 Stat. 1987 (1989).
124. Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing H.R. 1, 1989 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1465-1, 1465-3 (Dec. 15, 1989).
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practically unavoidable. What effect, if any, should the Department's
recent history have on the generous deference normally accorded the
housing agency in exercising its discretionary functions?125 Future lit-
igants challenging HUD decision-making might find, for example,
that the judicial audience, in the light of continuing accounts of wide-
spread irregularities, will be more receptive to allegations that depart-
ment officials abused their discretion and violated the public trust.
Judges who are especially committed to the ideal of judicial restraint
will face special challenges in these cases. Officials charged with ad-
ministering extant and prospective HUD programs, and legal counsel
representing the Department, should anticipate this potential legacy
of the HUD scandal - a legacy of judicial skepticism leading to de-
lay, and, perhaps, to modification or invalidation of agency decisions.
Judges are not the only interested observers who might have an
impact on the future direction of the Department. Extensive negative
publicity should have a decided influence on public perceptions of
HUD. Throughout the nation, news reports and editorial pages
bemoaned the sad state of affairs in federal housing and development.
This universal condemnation should make it extremely difficult to
generate popular support for any new substantive programs that vest
significant discretion in high-ranking, political appointees at HUD.
Secretary Kemp's objections to the contrary, the HUD scandal will
continue to have a noticeable impact on legislators (and their staffers)
who draft, broker, promote and shepherd housing legislation through
the congressional lawmaking process. What member of Congress is
willing to risk the opprobrium of constituents who are angered be-
cause their elected representative proposed a discretionary housing
program that resulted in yet another HUD scandal?
There is the further risk that judicial and popular displeasure will
be replicated on the state and local levels. Nonfederal housing offi-
cials and legislators - already pressed by dwindling HUD dollars
and budgetary shortfalls - can hardly afford such negative fallout.
State judges, in evaluating state and local administrative decision-
125. See, e.g., C. DAYE, D. MANDELKER, 0. HETZEL, HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 70 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter DAYE].
Judicial review of federal programs lies in the federal courts and is primarily
governed by the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Act places
substantial obstacles in the way of successful litigation in its provision that ac-
tion "committed to agency discretion" is not subject to judicial review. Because
federal housing legislation usually confers a substantial amount of discretion on
federal and local agencies, judicial challenges to agency action in these cases
may not be successful .... Courts are likely to find program decisions discre-
tionary and not subject to judicial review.
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making, like their federal counterparts will find it hard to ignore the
pervasive improprieties and excesses that tainted the nation's central
housing agency during the Pierce years.
There could, of course, be a positive side to jurists questioning the
normally generous deference accorded local, state, and federal hous-
ing agencies. Judicial attention to the decision-making process might
lead to more carefully crafted programs that are more responsive to
housing needs and less attractive to windfall-seeking developers and
their consultants. Unfortunately, there is the real risk that judicial
and popular oversight could have a profound chilling effect on the
kinds of innovative housing programs designed to narrow the dis-
turbing affordability gap. Such a development - when combined
with the predominant judicial refusal to recognize a fundamental
right to decent housing 26 - would be most unwelcome given the
needs and demands of unsheltered and inadequately housed
Americans.
In the coming months, we will witness countless proposals for "fix-
ing" HUD. 127 Some will advocate stricter congressional oversight,
perhaps by one or two key committees. Others might suggest that
some responsibilities such as FHA be taken away from the scandal-
ridden Department and transferred either to an independent agency
or to the domain of another cabinet secretary. Some may even be so
bold as to proffer the dismantling of the Department, a process that
proceeded defacto during the Reagan presidency. Perhaps the federal
government could spend its time and resources better supporting in-
novative state and local endeavors.
Whatever substantive schemes emerge from Washington, we must
not lose sight of the ultimate goal, a goal expressed as the nation
emerged victorious from World War II with visions of rebuilding on a
grand scale. We must do our best to ensure that the "solutions" cho-
126. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). "We do not denigrate the im-
portance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide
judicial remedies for every social and economic ill." Id. at 74. Justice White's cold rheto-
ric is perhaps the most telling sign that the Warren Court era was truly at an end. But cf
DAYE, supra note 125, at 47-55 ("A Right to Housing and the Challenge of
Homelessness").
127. For an especially ambitious proposal, see [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev.
Rep. (BNA) 317 (Sept. 18, 1989):
Two high-ranking HUD officials have drafted a $10 billion, 26-point housing
initiative for HUD Secretary Jack Kemp's consideration that emphasizes home-
ownership through such ideas as changing HUD's name to the HOME Depart-
ment, launching an aggressive campaign to sell 50,000 houses in the FHA
inventory, and creating inner-city "housing zones."
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sen increase the chances that all Americans will have access to decent,
affordable housing. For, as Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., reminded the nation shortly after it celebrated victory in the First
World War, "[h]ousing is a necessary of life."12
128. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921).
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